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A Novel Dynamic Key Management Scheme for Secure Multicasting
Junqi Zhang’, Vijay Varadharajan’, and Yi Mu2
Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
School of Information Technology and Computer Science,
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia

Abstract-We pmpose a new secure multicast scheme based
on a novel hybrid key distribution scheme. This scheme meets the
requirements described in the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) for multicast security architecture. It exhibits certain
unique advantages in security services over existing schemes in
the area of dynamic gmup key management. Our scheme allows
efficient mechanisms for group members to join and leave a
group frequently.

1. INTRODUCTION

In multicasting, a message is sent from one party to many
recipients, or from many recipients to many recipients[l].
Internet Protocol (IF’) Multicasting was first proposed and
specified in the 1980s. Since the creation of the Mbone in
1992, the interests in IF’ Multicast has been expanding rapidly.
This is because multicasting enables the desired applications
to service many users without overloading a network and
resources in the server. In general, multicast applications can
include both real-time and non-real-time applications which
may involve data and multimedia.
Security is essential for data. transmission over public
networks. As defined in IS0 7498[2], there are several facets
to security: confidentiality, integrity, access control, authentication, non-repudiation, and auditing and accountability.
There are several pmtocols widely used to address the unicast
security issues, hut often they may not be directly extended
to a multicast environment. Multicasting introduces some
distinct security issues differing to unicast [3][41[5] . First, in
general multicasting is more vulnerable than unicast, because
transmissions occur over many network channels. A more
difficult issue arises due to the multicast gmup membership
being usually dynamic. Users can leave and join the groups,
thus making the issue of group management a significant
challenge in large scale systems. Also we need to ensure
forward and backward secrecy. Forward secrecy implies that
whenever a member of a gmup leaves the group, s h e must
he prevented from having further access to the data and keys
of that multicast group. Backward secrecy requires that the
data communicated within a group before a new member
or members join must remain secret to the new member or
members. Other multicast security requirements include “ I
affects all” scalability and data source authentication. The
former requirement implies that the addition or removal of
one or more members from a gmup should not affect other
members of the gmup. The latter addresses the situation where
an adversary or a group member poses as a member or another
member of the group in sending the data. This requires group
member authentication and data origin authentication.
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Several schemes have been proposed for secure multicasting over the recent years, which can be classified into
three categories [4][6][7]: centralized flat schemes, distributed
flat schemes, and hierarchical schemes. Specific ones include
manual key distribution, painvise keying, hierarchical trees,
secure lock, distributed registration and Key Distribution
(DiRK)[Xl[9][5]. We will give a brief analysis of these
schemes in Section 5 and compare them with our new scheme
proposed in this paper.
In this paper, we present a novel secure multicast schemes
based on a novel hybrid key distribution scheme. It provides
dynamic group key management service that allow group
members to join and leave a group frequently. Furthermore
our scheme is able to address data origin authentication and
group member authentication without introducing specific
additional mechanisms. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 introduces the LETF multicast security
architecture reference framework[lO]. Section 3 presents our
key distribution scheme. Section 4 proposes our new securing
multicasting scheme. Section 5 compares our scheme with the
previously proposed schemes. Finally, section 6 provides the
concluding remarks.
11. MULTICAST
SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
REFERENCE

FRAMEWORK
This section reviews briefly the multicast security architecture reference framework proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (LEIF)[IO] [Ill.
A. Reference Framework

A schematic representation of the Draft Multicast Security
Reference Framework is shown in Figure 1. This framework
is used to classify and specify the functional areas, functional
elements (represented by the boxes), and their interfaces
(represented by the arrows).
There are three sets of functional entities and three functional areas. The three sets of functional entities are the Policy
Server, Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS), Sender and
Receiver. The policy server provides functions to create and
manage security policies specific to a multicast group. The
Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) provides functions
relating to the management of cryptographic keys used by a
multicast gmup.
Based on the number of senders, multicast is divided into
two types, I-to-N and M-to-N. In a 1-to-N multicast, only one
sender can transmit data to a group. In a M-to-N multicast,
multiple (or all) group members can transmit data to a group.

The three functional areas are multicast data handling,
group key management, and the multicast security policies.
Multicast data handling covers issues concerning the
security-related treatment of multicast data by the sender and
the receiver. Typically, the data is encrypted by a group key
and authenticated to a multicast group. The data encryption
mainly addresses the issue of confidentiality. The data authentication takes two flavors; (1) source authentication and data
integrity, (2) group authentication, which guarantees that data
was generated by some group member.
Group key management is concerned with the secure distribution and refreshing of keying material. The keying material
refers to the cryptographic key belonging to a group, the state
associated with the keys and the other security parameters
related to the keys. The problems that should be addressed
include: (I)member identification and authentication, (2)
verification of the membership to groups, (3) establishment
of a secure channel between a GCKS entity and the member,
(4) establishment of a long-term secure channel between one
GCKS entity and another, (5) the changing of keys and keying
material, and (6) detection of signaling failures and perceived
compromises to keys and keying material.
The multicast security policies provide aspects of policy
in the context of multicast security and must provide the
rules for operation for the other elements of the Reference
Framework. These include the policy creation, high-level
policy translation, and policy representation.
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Fig. 1.

C. Group Key Management Architecture

Group Key Management is one of the main aspects of
securing multicast. The aim of a group key management
protocol is to provide the group members with the up-to-date
security association. The Group Security Association Model is
shown in Figure 2. The Group Key Management Architecture
consists of three protocols: the Registration Protocol, the Rekey protocol, and the Data Security protocol. The Re-key
protocol is optional in some cases.

POLICY
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Fig. 2.
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Management

Security Policy Management area along the interface between
Key Servers and Policy Servers.

M u l t i c ~ ~Security
t
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B. Security Service
Several security services are specified for the interfaces of
Figure 1. The three security services - multicast data confidentiality, multicast source authentication and data integrity,
multicast group authentication - are placed in the functional
area of Multicast Data Handling along the interface between
Senders and Receivers. Two security services - multicast
group member management and multicast key management are placed in the Group Key Management Area. One security
service - multicast policy management - is placed in the
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The Group Security Association Model

There are two types of gmup key: the KEK (key-encrypting
key) and the TEK (traffic-encrypting key). The KEK maybe
a single key that encrypts the TEK or a vector of keys that
encrypts the TEK and other TEKs. The KEK is established
by the Registration Protocol and used by the re-key protocol.
The TEK is established by the Re-key Protocol and is used
by the Data Security Protocol to protect streams, files or other
data sent and received by the Data Security Protocol.
The IETF Group Key Management architecture also provides an implementation diagram. There are several functional
blocks to implement the group key management. One is the
GKM (Group Key Management) functional block that is used
to establish the GSA (Gmup Security Associations) to use the
Registration Protocol and the Re-key protocol. Another one
is the CONTROL function that directs the GCKS to establish
a group (including “join or leave”). CONTROL includes the
authorization subject to Group Policy. CONTROL maybe a
telephony signal protocol like SIP. CONTROL could perform
the announce functions that can direct group key management
using the application programming interface (MI).The third
functional block is the SECURITY PROTOCOL function that
protects the data transmission. It may span inter-networking
and application layers. Other function blocks are specific to
the operating system (OS), databases such as Security Policy
Database (SPD) and Credential Stores (CRED).

111. KEYGENERATION
ALGORITHM

Our approach involves the proposal of a dynamic group
key management scheme that enables secure and,. efficient
updating of group members. We achieve this by constructing
a public key that is associated with several associated private
keys. Our proposal for secure multicasting is based on our
earlier work on key distribution described in [12].
A. Preliminaries

The security of our scheme is based on the difficulty of
computing discrete logarithms, and the protocols are based
on the polynomial functions and a set of exponentials.
Let p be a large prime, Z; he a multiplicative group of
order q for qlp - 1, and g E Z, for i = 0,1,2, ...,n be a set
of integers. A polynomial function of order n is constructed
C:=,aixi modq,
as follows: f(x) = n:="=,z - zi)
where the ai are coefficients: a0 = n y = , ( - x j ) . a1 =
an--2 = c:#i(-zi)(-zj), an-1 =
a, = 1. Note that f(q)
= c:=,aiz; = 0. We
can use this property to construct a broadcasting encryption
system.
Having the set [ai},we can then construct the corresponding exponential functions,

n:+j(-z3),...,

C:=l(-zj),

{g"",g"',g"',..

C. Broadcasting Encryption Protocol
The encryption key A is used to encrypt a session key that
is then used to encrypt a message. All members in the group
can decrypt the session key and then decrypt the message
individually with their private keys. Let us suppose that M is
the message to he encrypted and k is a session key.
The protocol is as follows:
Select an integer T ER Z,.
Compute tj = gaT and cj = gsbr,
Compute the ciphertext c = E k ( M ) and k' = kA"',
where E k ( . ) denotes a symmetric key encryption function.
Broadcast the 4-tuple (B,cj, c, k') to all subscribers.
To decrypt the session key, the user j computes k'jx~g'~=
k. k is then used for the decryption of the message.

.
.

Iv. OUR NEW SECURE MULTICAST
SCHEME
In this section, we present our new multicast scheme for
I-to-N multicasting. The GCKS can act as the sender. We
concentrate only on the group key management protocol and
then discuss the security aspects.
A. Key Registration

The group establishment ladder diagram is shown in Figure
3 [13][12]. Because our scheme involves only I-to-N multi-

casting, the sender can act as the controller or the GCKS. The
protocol shows how a potential member registers and gets the
member key ( Z j , % j ) .

.,sa"}= {90,91,g2,...,gn)

B. System Setup

The construction of the encryption keys and decryption
keys is done as follows:
Select n distinct random numbers xi E Z, for a =
1 , 2 , . . ' ,n,which form a set X, and a subset X, C X,.
Compute A = n;=,(n:I;g?) modp. Note that A is
computed once only. We will see later, a dynamic further
updates of the system do .not require re-computation of

.
.

.
..

A.
Select an integer b E Z,and compute its multiplicative
inverse b-' such that bb-' = 1 modq.
Compute Zi = b-' E
n
. zn modq, for j = 1,2, _..,n.
%#3 '
Compute ij = s j x y , where sj = sish.. . s i .
sjs: modq = s i . (sj,s: E Z q ) ,and SI
1s: for V i , j .

These values satisfy the equality:
9sbz,ge',

AS

= 1,

Fig. 3. The Group Establishment Ladder Diagram

V j t [I,", .. . ,n}.

A is kept by the authorized server and will he used as the
encryption key. Since the encryption key is not public, there
is no need for us to protect it against any illegal modification.
Zj and 4 are given to user j as its secret decryption key
during the process of its registration. Hence the private dePlease note that computation
cryption key doublet is ( E j .
of A is a one-time task. The server does not need to modify
it during a system update. This is an important feature, since
it makes the encryptioddecryption processes very efficient (a
maximum of 2 or 3 exponential computations).

s).
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The first phase involves a potential member requesting to
join the group. The GCKS processes the Request to Join (RTJ)
and then establishes the Security Associations (SA). Another
mechanism is for the GCKS to invite a prospective member
to join the group. The invited prospective member responds
to the invitation, and the GCKS processes the response and a
agreement is achieved.
The second phase is the key distribution. After the GCKS
and the potential member make an agreement, they can use
the secure channel such as the P s e c or TLs/SSL to transmit
the secret private key to the member.

B. Re-Keying

To remove a member, the GCKS docs not need to reconstmct thc cncryption key A. Instead, the GCKS only
recomputes s such that s!, does not include the member to he
removed; the computation is s = CL,,tZ,s: . We can still
use the protocol above without any modification.
To add new members to the group, the GCKS makes use
of an element in the spare set X, - X,. Recall that we have
assumed that the actual number of members is less than the
total set. That is, m < n or X, < X,. Hence to add a new
member, the GCKS just simple moves one unused element
from X,,- X, to X,.

C. Security Keys
As mentioned in section 2, we have two types of group key:
the KEK and the TEK. KEK is used for the re-keying protocol
and the TEK is used for the data transfer security protocol.
In this scheme, there are two ways to encrypt the data. The
GCKS with the encryption key (A) acts as both KEK and
TEK. In the re-keying protocol, the GCKS recomputes s for
an updale of the group.
One can also adopt a hybrid approach. The GCKS’s encryption key is used for the KEK. The GCKS generates a
symmetric key as the TEK to encrypt the message to he
transmitted. The message to he transmitted is encrypted with
the TEK that is encrypted with the KEK, and is then sent
to the assoicated members. The members can decrypt it with
their own private key to get the session key TEK, and then
use it to decrypt the cipher message.
D. Security Services
As discussed in section 2, the security services are placed
in three areas. Three of them are placed in the multicast data
handling area. They are the Multicast Data Confidentiality,
Multicast Source Authentication and the Multicast Group
Authentication. Our scheme uses the asymmetric distributed
encryption system; that is, the sender or the members use
the asymmetric key. Hence we achieve Multicast Source
Authentication and the Multicast Group Authentication. The
data is encrypted by the sender’s private key, and only
qualified members can decrypt it, and hence the Multicast
Data Confidentiality is also ensured.
Additional security services in the group key management
area include the Multicast Group Member Management and
the Multicast Key Management. In our scheme, the GCKS
manages the group members and the asymmetric encryption
key system, which makes the provision of both these services
efficient.

V. COMPARISON OF OUR PROPOSED SECURE
MULTICASTING SCHEME WITH PREVIOUS SCHEMES
There are several existing secure multicasting schemes. As
we mentioned before, it can he divided into I-to-N and Mto-N multicast. The existing key distribution scheme can he
divided into scalable and non-scalable protocols. The scalable
key distribution protocols can he classified as two categories:
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the Flat scheme and the Hierarchical scheme [4][61. In this
section, we introduce these schemes briefly and then compare
our proposed scheme with those schemes.
The flat scheme can be further classified as Centralized
Flat schemes and Distributed Flat schemes. Centralized Flat
Schemes use a single entity to distribute encryption key to
all group members. When a prospective member joins or
leaves the group, the group key controller transmits the new
session key (TEK) to all members using the secure channel.
Examples of this type of schemes are ETM [141, GKMP[lS],
PDKD [I61 and CFKWDMG[l’I][lS]. In the GKMP (Group
Key Management Protocol), the GCKS shares the traffic
encryption key (TEK) and the key encryption key (KEK).
In the ETM (Elements of Trusted Multicasting), the GCKS
sends the encrypted multicast data, and then sends the TEK
encrypted with the group members public key. The PDKD
(Perfectly Secure Dynamic Conference Key Distribution) uses
a secret share scheme for secure group data transmission. The
group members compute a common key and any member can
identify any other member. In the CFKM-DMG (Centralized
Flat Key Management for Dynamic Multicast Group), the
GCKS assigns the binary IDS to all members of the group
and then generates and 2W KEKs, where W is the number of
hits in any member’s ID. There is a TEK for all the memhers
of the group.
Distributed Flat Schemes trust all the members equally;
the new member can get the encryption key from an earlier
joined member and there is no GCKS or manager. There is
a distributed version of CFKM-DMG (Centralized Flat Key
Management for Dynamic Multicast Group)[l7].
The Hierarchical scheme uses a distribution tree to distribute the session key. It can he further classified into
hierarchical node based protocols and hierarchical key based
protocols. Hierarchical node based schemes use a hierarchy
of the nodes to address the scalability issue. Some of this
type schemes are SMKD[lYl, Iolus[20] and DEP[ZIl. SMKD
(Scalable Multicast Key Distribution) protocol uses the Core
Based Tree (CBT) architecture for the key distribution, The
primary core generates the TEK and the KEK, and then
distributes these keys to the secondary core and subsequently
to other nodes as they become part of the distribution tree.
Iolus proposed the idea of hierarchical subgroup for scalable
secure multicasting. The GCKS distributes the secret key to
the top-level subgroup. The group security agents (GSA) share
a secret key with each of their subgroup members. These
secret keys act as the KEK. The TEK is distributed with
the multicast data. DEF’ (Dual Encryption Protocol) also uses
the hierarchical subgroup of multicast members to address
scalability.
The hierarchical key based scheme uses a hierarchical of
key to deal with scalability. Examples of this type of scheme
include CTKM[22] and OlT[23]. In CTKM (Centralized
Tree-base Key Management) scheme, multicast group members are leaves of the key distribution tree of an arbitrary
degree. The internal nodes of the tree represent a KEK.
Members share the KEK with the group manager. In the OFT
(One Way Function Trees) scheme, each internal node has
two children. Each node has a blind version of its key that is

computed with the one-way function. The GCKS generates
the blinded kcy, and the members can compute the rest of the
.* "
key.
The comparison of the secure multicast schemes is shown
in table 1.
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the KEK transfer process.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a new secure multicast scheme based
on a novel key distribution scheme. Our scheme possesses
several new features that are significant in dynamic gmup key
management. It enables efficient joining or leaving of group
members without affecting the rest of the group members.
This is an important characteristic when it comes to large scale
systems involving several millions of users. Our scheme is
computationally efficient, since it involves a relatively few (2
or 3) encryptioddecryption operations per update. We believe
that the pmposed scheme is in general applicable to many
other multicasting applications.
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